Under Article 178(6) of the Criminal Code, a person is liable for the acts provided for in paragraphs 1 and 5 only where there is a complaint from the victim or a statement from its lawful representative, or a prosecutor's demand.
Under Article 72(2) and (3) of the Criminal Code, the stolen perfume, as the result of a prohibited act, must be confiscated in all cases.
In this story, a man captured by surveillance cameras in a store on Baltų pr. on 6 September may face not a criminal case but a criminal misdemeanour case — if the value of the perfume, EUR 228, qualifies as property of "small value" under Article 190(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania (property of small value exceeding 3 MGL but not exceeding 10 MGL). In that case, Article 178(5) of the Criminal Code applies: community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, or arrest. The precise classification will depend on whether EUR 228 exceeds 3 MGL — if it does not, the act may be treated as petty theft under Article 108 of the Code of Administrative Offences (a fine of EUR 90 to 400).
The pre-trial investigation into the theft is conducted by officers of the Santaka Police Commissariat of the Kaunas County Chief Police Commissariat; the investigation is organised and supervised by prosecutors of the 3rd Division of the Kaunas District Prosecutor's Office.
If the person is identified and the victim files a complaint, the pre-trial investigation will be completed and the prosecutor will adopt a procedural decision — a charging instrument for a criminal misdemeanour under Article 178(5) of the Criminal Code, or a termination of the case.
Correction. The news report states that, having accepted the appeal, the Supreme Court will hear it under oral procedure, but this formulation is incomplete. Under Article 372 of the CCP, a cassation case is heard under oral procedure only in the cases provided for in Article 374² of the CCP — for instance, where the appeal is filed on grounds aggravating the convicted person's position — while in other cases the case is examined under written procedure. It would be more accurate to state that the selection panel, in accepting the appeal, determined the procedural format, but the fact of acceptance itself does not mean the appeal will be granted. The news report also fails to identify which specific grounds under Article 369(1) of the CCP the appeal invokes, which is essential information for assessing its prospects.
Under Article 369(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a cassation appeal is granted only where an improperly applied criminal law is established or material procedural violations are found that restricted the rights of the accused or prevented a just verdict.
The court did not impose the supplementary measures provided for in Article 68-1 of the Criminal Code — deprivation of public rights (for three to seven years for grave and especially grave offences under Chapter XXXIII) — and therefore the convicted person retained the right to be elected and to stand in next year's mayoral elections.
In the case of R. Malinauskas, a final and effective conviction and a paid fine of EUR 60,000 mean that the criminal liability aspect has been resolved, but the question of cassation review remains — namely, whether the appellate court properly examined his appeal. The precise legal question: whether the Supreme Court of Lithuania (LAT), assessing the case under Article 369 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Lithuania, will establish an improper application of the criminal law or material procedural violations on which the request is based to annul part of the appellate court's ruling and remand the case for a fresh hearing. An additional question concerns the future limits of public rights: since the court did not order deprivation of public rights, under Article 68-1(1) of the Criminal Code R. Malinauskas retains the right to be elected, and having paid the fine, he may stand in next year's mayoral elections.
The cassation appeals selection panel of the Supreme Court of Lithuania decided to accept the appeal and hear the case in oral proceedings. R. Malinauskas's request is not to quash the conviction on the merits, but to annul the part of the appellate ruling by which his appeal was dismissed and to remand the case to the appellate court. Guilt was established for acts qualified under Article 225 of the Criminal Code, as well as trading in influence, bribery, and unlawful enrichment. The court imposed only a fine, but did not impose the supplementary measures provided for in Article 68-1 of the Criminal Code: deprivation of public rights or disqualification from holding certain positions. It was precisely this circumstance that allowed the convicted person to retain active electoral rights and to stand as a candidate next year. The Special Investigation Service (STT), examining the circumstances of his employment as chief adviser to the municipal administration, found no signs of corruption-related criminal activity and declined to open a pre-trial investigation.
If the Supreme Court upholds the cassation appeal arguments, part of the appellate ruling will be annulled and the case remanded to the appellate court for a fresh hearing — this would open the possibility of reconsidering the sentencing, including the question of imposing supplementary criminal measures, such as deprivation of public rights under Article 68-1 of the Criminal Code. If the Supreme Court dismisses the appeal, the effective conviction with the EUR 60,000 fine will remain unchanged, and R. Malinauskas's right to stand in next year's mayoral elections will remain intact. In practical terms, this matters most to the voters and council of the Druskininkai municipality: V. Grigorienė is temporarily acting as mayor, while since 18 September R. Malinauskas has been working as chief adviser to the municipal administration on a salary of EUR 5,664 gross.
For the acts covered by this Article, a person is liable only where there is a complaint from the victim, a statement from his or her legal representative, a prosecutor's demand, or where a pre-trial investigation has been initiated upon establishing signs of domestic violence (Article 145(3) of the Criminal Code).
Together with the penalty, confiscation of property may be imposed under Article 72(2) of the Criminal Code, where the property was the instrument, means, or result of the offence.
The key legal position in this story is that threats made in in-game voice chats qualify as a criminal offence, and the recordings transferred by the platform become the principal evidence. If such a case were assessed under Lithuanian law, the question would arise which provision of the Criminal Code applies: Article 145(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania (threat to kill or cause serious harm to health) or Article 145(2) (terrorising a person, including systematic intimidation through psychological coercion), or — in the case of milder conduct — Article 284 of the Criminal Code (breach of public order through abusive conduct or threats). Both variants of Article 145 provide for imprisonment — up to two years and up to four years, respectively. A separate issue is the assessment of statements about an armed conflict with law enforcement officers: such statements may approach Article 287 of the Criminal Code (threat against a state official) or Article 250-1 (incitement to terrorism, punishable by imprisonment of up to three years), although the application of the latter provision depends on whether the statements encouraged a specific act of terror.
In applying Article 145(1) of the Criminal Code, the essential condition is sufficient grounds to believe that the threat could be carried out — in the context of continuous, repeated threats made through chats, this criterion is assessed in light of all the circumstances. A specific procedural particularity is Article 145(3) of the Criminal Code: for the acts covered by this Article, a person is liable only where there is a complaint from the victim, a statement from his or her legal representative, a prosecutor's demand, or where a pre-trial investigation has been initiated upon establishing signs of domestic violence. Article 284 of the Criminal Code contains no such restrictions and may be applied where the threats disturbed public peace in a public setting; in this case, voice chats across several players' channels may constitute such publicity. Under Article 2(4) of the Criminal Code, liability for committing an act arises only where the act satisfies the elements of a specific crime or misdemeanour, while Article 2(1) establishes the principle that the law in force at the time of the commission of the act applies. The usual practical route for officers is to initiate a pre-trial investigation on the basis of the available voice recordings, while the aspect of liability under Article 145(4) of the Criminal Code — that a legal entity may also be held liable — is not relevant here, since the threats were made by a natural person.
The practical consequences for the perpetrator of such conduct include the broad range of penalties and criminal-impact measures permitted by Article 42(1) of the Criminal Code: community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or fixed-term imprisonment. Together with the penalty, additional measures may be imposed under Article 67(2) of the Criminal Code, for example:
As regards the position of the platform "Epic Games" — the transferred voice recordings are evidence that substantiates both identification and the content of the conduct; however, the company itself, having a moderation system, is not liable for a user's threats, because Article 145(4) of the Criminal Code applies only where the legal entity itself committed the act provided for in that Article. In the US context, the key practical message for players in this story is that the reporting system retains the last minutes of the conversation, which may be passed to law enforcement.
Correction. None.
Article 260(3) CC provides for imprisonment from ten to fifteen years for the production or possession of a very large quantity of narcotic substances, and under para. 4, a legal entity is also liable for the acts under this article.
Article 10(2¹) of the Law on Approval of the Statute on the Use of Military Force permits the use of military force against unmanned aircraft only in a prohibited or restricted zone, where flights are conducted in non-compliance with the procedure set by the commander of the armed forces, by decision of the Minister of National Defence or an authorized person.
In this digest, the most legally significant event is the dismantling of a drug laboratory in Vilnius district: its organizers and participants will be liable under Article 260 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania (CC), rather than under the more lenient Article 259, because the discovery of more than half a tonne of methamphetamine and 300 kg of amphetamine indicates production intended for distribution. The second legal issue concerns shooting down drones: whether an aircraft detected by radar but not visually identified may be destroyed by military force; this will be resolved under Article 10(2¹) of the Law on Approval of the Statute on the Use of Military Force and Article 6 of the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security. The difference between the positions of the President and the Prime Minister is essentially about whether the condition established in the statute — "non-compliance with the procedure set by the commander of the armed forces" — can be interpreted expansively, on the presumption that an unidentified object is inherently dangerous.
Article 260 CC establishes a graduated sentencing framework based on quantity and purpose: for possession with intent to distribute — imprisonment from 2 to 8 years (para. 1); for a large quantity — from 8 to 10 years (para. 2); for a very large quantity — from 10 to 15 years (para. 3). Half a tonne of methamphetamine and 300 kg of amphetamine fall into the "very large quantity" category under any conventional assessment of quantities, so the applicable sentencing range is 10–15 years; moreover, under Article 260(4), legal entities are also liable, which in practice means possible prosecution of a company whose services were used for the laboratory. If the evidence reveals that the products were transported across the border to Western European markets, Article 260¹ CC — trafficking in narcotic substances — would additionally apply, where para. 4 provides for imprisonment from 4 to 12 years for transporting a large quantity across the state border; the two offences may compete, and the court will qualify the conduct according to which stage of the activity is proven. Regarding drones: Article 10(2¹) of the Law on Approval of the Statute on the Use of Military Force permits the use of military force against unmanned aircraft in a prohibited or restricted zone only where flights are conducted in non-compliance with the procedure set by the commander of the armed forces, with the decision taken by the Minister of National Defence or an authorized person — this means that "shooting down without visual confirmation" is procedurally possible only through the decision-making actor prescribed by law and in a zone where such a procedure is in force. Article 6 of the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security supplements this framework: Lithuania "shall immediately request NATO consultations when it perceives a direct threat," and the Prime Minister's proposal to request consultations corresponds precisely to this provision. Article 17(2) of the Aviation Law instructs the Government to ensure airspace control "taking into account airspace needs for national security purposes," while para. 3 grants it the right to establish a procedure for recording airspace violations — it is this procedure that will in practice determine how a radar-detected but unidentified object is recorded.
In the laboratory case, arrests and charges under Article 260(3) CC are likely, with a sentencing range of 10–15 years; if cross-border transportation of the consignment is proven, Article 260¹(4) (4–12 years) will be added, and legal-entity liability may also reach companies that provided logistics or raw-material services. On the drone issue, the nearest practical step is NATO consultations initiated by the Prime Minister under Article 6 of the National Security Law and possible renewed decisions by the Government or the commander of the armed forces regarding prohibited zones and procedures; until such a procedure is clarified, the decision to shoot down remains legally within the competence of the Minister of National Defence and applies only in prohibited or restricted zones.
Under the Procedure for the Examination of Disciplinary Cases of Attorneys, the limitation period for disciplinary liability is one year, calculated from the date the offense was committed — that is, from August 2024, when the services were provided.
For violations specified in Article 52(1), the Court of Honour may impose a reprimand, a censure, a publicly announced censure, or propose the annulment of the decision recognising a person as an attorney (Article 53).
A disciplinary sanction against L. Matjošaitytė for providing legal services to "Nemuno aušra" without a written contract cannot be imposed on the merits alone — the Bar Association established a violation but blocked the imposition of liability on limitation grounds. The legal question raised by this story: does the provision of services without a written legal services agreement constitute a disciplinary offense under Article 52(1) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, and can disciplinary liability still be imposed where the limitation period for disciplinary liability has expired.
Disciplinary cases against attorneys are heard by the Court of Honour of the Bar (Article 52(3) of the Law on the Bar), while the Lithuanian Bar decides whether to institute proceedings. For violations specified in Article 52(1), the Court of Honour may impose the following sanctions:
In practice, L. Matjošaitytė will face no further disciplinary consequences on the Bar track — only the potential public reputational effect of the Council's recommendation. Two other investigations remain in focus: the CEC has already opened an investigation into the cooperation between the attorney and the party, while the STT's oversight body (VTEK) is examining a potential conflict of interest — it is there that it will be determined whether the CEC member, who returned to office in 2025 by a Seimas decision through a candidate submitted by the "Nemuno aušra"-delegated Minister of Justice, violated official ethics requirements. Watchpoint: await the findings of the CEC and VTEK and a possible appeal by the attorney against the decision of the Bar Council.